Moral Relativists Aren't All Bad

"Cicero," Cesare Maccari
Christian educators are often eager to dismantle moral relativism as part of "worldview" curricula or humanities courses. This is understandable: the vast majority of Americans are (unknowing) moral relativists in 2018, long after the position was abandoned by most serious philosophers.

But in my experience, many realist v. relativist arguments quickly devolve into shouting matches about Hitler. These rhetorical bloodbaths end with both parties feeling self-righteous and more entrenched in their position. I sense that these arguments aren't good for a Christian's witness. Why can't Christians be more persuasive on a topic where they clearly have the high ground?

One key mistake Christians make: moral relativism deserves some credit. Most moderns who repeat sayings like "everyone has their own morality" or treat ethical debates as matters of personal preference don't do so because they've carefully reflected on the nature of morality. Instead, many are trying to fairly react to the world's widely divergent moral beliefs with intellectual humility and generosity. Since it is bewilderingly difficult to adjudicate competing moral claims, they assume it is impossible. More technically, they confuse epistemology (how we discover moral truth) with metaphysics (whether there is moral truth).

You might think I'm giving relativism too much credit, but it has a kernel of truth: ethical reasoning is hard, especially when the people involved believe they live in fundamentally different universes! This is to say nothing of the endless proliferation of moral terms that we use outside of a meaningful, shared framework for understanding them -- terms like rights, duties, virtues, sins, intentions, consequences, etc.. Throw in all of our confirmation biases, our tribalism, our natural pride/competitiveness, and you can see why many people are convinced that moral argumentation is pointless and inherently manipulative.

My colleague Sean Riley often counters this mistake by asking students to imagine a cubic foot of dirt in the lawn outside our classroom. How many ants are in that cubic foot at time slice t? They speculate and take guesses, some better than others. Even though we'll never know exactly the answer, there still is a correct answer. Also, though we may never have a neat and precise answer, there are clearly better and worse answers.

This isn't a perfect analogy to ethics, especially if you believe that there are some obvious moral truths. But it is a good way of explaining the difference between the "what is" question and the "how do we figure it out" question. If you tell anyone without serious philosophical training that there are clear moral truths which apply to all of humanity, their first question will be: "how do you discover them?" This is a challenging question. It is one worth answering. But it is a different question.

Conversations with moral relativists should start by recognizing why so many of us have the instinct to abandon moral debate. Relativists need to see that they can be moral realists without sacrificing humility or generosity. Naming these instincts as virtuous often disarms relativists who have acquired such a strong distaste for moral debate. Imagine moving from Position A: "Moral debate is impossible -- there must be no moral facts" -- to Position B: "Moral debate is really, really hard, but it's important, so let's be very careful about the way we do it." The two positions are a small conceptual leap from each other but represent vastly different outlooks on the world.

Position B is also much more internally coherent. Very few relativists are really, deep down, willing to tolerate evil. They instinctively recognize injustice as injustice and demonstrate this by actively protesting it. When a relativist understands that their moral instincts are tapping into deep, mysterious, and unalterable properties of the universe, it frees them to be more human! 

All of this to say: don't treat discussions about moral relativism with students or peers as "gotcha" moments. As a metaphysical position, moral relativism is incoherent. But most relativists are motivated by frustration with contemporary ethical debate, not careful reflection about the nature of morality. If moral relativism is a perverted version of Socratic humility, the position can be framed as almost right rather than utterly wrong -- a more winsome critique that encourages relativists to pursue wisdom without shortcuts or despair.

(Citations: Much of this is a reflection on the first few chapters of After Virtue by Alasdair Macintyre, but I also should credit David O'Hara for this excellent, measured critique of moral relativism to skeptical high schoolers.)

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